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Abstract
This paper considers a number of emerging technologies and how they 
challenge the underpinnings of copyright law in Australia. It draws upon 
the  idea  that  copyright  law must  ‘balance’  the  rights  of  stakeholders 
(creators of works, inventors of technology and users of works) in order 
to provide the most effective environment for the protection and use of 
works. This paper further suggests that existing copyright legislation can 
be divided into provisions that offer rights to creators of works (‘front 
end’ provisions), and other provisions that restrict the rights of users and 
inventors of technology (the ‘back end’ provisions). It analyses the use of 
‘media neutral’  language in copyright legislation in both the front and 
back  end  provisions  and  argues  that  the  creators  of  works  have  far 
broader rights and protections than those offered in the back end to users 
and inventors. Further, through an analysis of emerging technologies it is 
argued that this imbalance offers an environment that restricts the uptake 
of  new technologies  and fails  to  properly  foster  the  protection  of  the 
rights of users of these new works and technologies.
In no other area of law in Australia is the ‘shock of legal uncertainty’ more profound 
than in copyright.2 The creation of legislation for copyright is a process of offering 
rights to the various competing stakeholders involved. This stakeholder balance exists 
in two distinct but interrelated components of copyright. First, I use the term ‘front 
end’ to refer to the provisions of the copyright legislation that offer rights to copyright 
1  Student in Bachelor of Laws/Bachelor of Arts in Communications  at the University of  Technology, 
Sydney.  This paper is based on the author’s Honours thesis.
2 S Halpern, ‘The Art of Compromise and Compromising Art: Copyright, Technology and  the Arts’ 
(2003) 50 J CopySoc USA 273 at 280.
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holders. Second, I use the term ‘back end’ to refer to those provisions which limit the 
rights of copyright holders. Generally, in order to provide sufficient balance between 
rights holders, rights users and the public  there needs to be some sort of  balance 
between this ‘front’ and ‘back’ end.
In order to better provide for the emergence of technologies over the past hundred 
years the legislature has employed various levels of ‘media neutral’ language in the 
front and back-end. This has allowed copyright holders to protect their works as new 
technologies have emerged, and for inventors and the public to have limited rights to 
use those works. However, since the introduction of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) this 
delicate balance has been altered. Subsequent amendments to the Act have broadened 
the media neutral language of the front-end provisions whilst neglecting the back-end. 
The existing legislative framework appears to offer a broad media neutral front-end 
and  a  media  specific  back-end  that  may  not  be  equipped  to  deal  with  emerging 
technologies.
The  Courts  have  been  quite  creative  in  alleviating  the  imbalance  up  until  now. 
Already the Courts have found it difficult to construe the back-end of the legislation 
in such a way as to properly provide for the interests  of inventors and the public 
where these emerging technologies are concerned.3 This paper begins with an analysis 
of media neutrality as it relates to copyright theory and the underlying need to balance 
the application of media neutrality in copyright. It reviews the balance between the 
legislative front and back-end over time.
Second, this paper analyses how Courts have construed media neutral language in the 
legislation and protected existing technologies over the past hundred years in the face 
of different front-end/back-end balances. This analysis suggests that the Courts have 
moved from technology-specific construction of legislation in Boosey regarding piano 
rolls,4 to haphazard application of the principle for object code in  Computer Edge,5 
and finally to relatively broad use of the principle for video games as cinematograph 
films in Sega.6 More recent decisions reflect a struggle for the Courts to supplement 
the imbalance.
Third, this paper reviews the problems that emerging technologies pose to the current 
copyright  legislation.  It  seeks  to  identify  the  various  problems  generated  by  new 
subject  matter  (the  focus  being  User-Generated  Content),  new  media  of  fixation 
(exploring  cloud-based  streaming),  and  new means  of  exploitation  (such  as  anti-
plagiarism  services).  These  problems  can  be  considered  in  light  of  the  recent 
decisions in iiNet7 and IceTV,8 highlighting the likely trends in judicial discourse and 
how this aggravates the potential problems of imbalance.
3 See for example Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment (2005) 221 ALR 448 at 
491 (Kirby J).
4 Boosey v Whight [1900] 1 Ch 122.
5 Computer Edge Pty Ltd v Apple Computer Inc (1986) 161 CLR 17.
6 Sega Enterprises Ltd v Galaxy Electronics Pty Ltd (1996) 35 IPR 161.
7 Roadshow Films v iiNet (2010) 263 ALR 215.
8 IceTV Pty Ltd v Nine Network Australia (2009) 254 ALR 386.
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What is media neutral thinking?
Media Neutrality
Media neutral interpretation of copyright legislation purports to provide a statute in 
which little (if any) distinction is made among the technologies by which works may 
be  exploited.9 Often  called  ‘technology  neutrality’10 or  the  ‘non-discrimination 
doctrine’11, media neutrality is reading legislative provisions (such as ‘author’, ‘work’ 
and ‘writing’)  in the broadest possible  sense,  so that  copyright  does not hold any 
relevant bias in favour of existing technologies. By not limiting the forms in which 
copyright subsists the Act promotes the development of new technologies and fosters 
the creation of works in different forms.
At first glance media neutrality offers rights holders an exclusive right to exploit all 
future technologies that may in some way contain, embody or provide a distribution 
platform  for  their  work.  And  why  shouldn’t  it?  If  copyright  law  fails  to  protect 
copyright  works  on  future  mediums  then  there  is  reluctance  on  rights  holders  to 
embrace new technologies. For example, had the term ‘sound recordings’ not been 
constructed to include audiotapes in addition to the existing vinyl  records then the 
major music labels may never have adopted the technology.12 Media neutrality is thus 
a method of ‘future proofing’ the legislation.13 But this understanding is limited. It 
looks  at  the  outcome  of  media  neutrality  as  proof  of  its  importance  –  using  the 
doctrine  to  prove  itself.  A  more  sophisticated  understanding  is  garnered  from an 
analysis of the theoretical and historical underpinnings of the doctrine.
Theoretical Underpinnings of Media Neutrality
Media neutrality is a product of various attempts by lawmakers to achieve  content  
protection in  the  copyright  spectrum and,  as  such,  is  rooted  deeply  in  copyright 
theory.  It  has  not  always  been  a  ‘user-oriented’  doctrine.14 There  is  certainly  an 
attractive quality about a doctrine where copyright is determined by how the end user 
interacts with content, and that the technology itself is not determinative of what type,  
or  whether  at  all,  copyright  exists.  Yet  as  useful  as  this  rationale  may  be  in  the 
contemporary context, it is not descriptive of how copyright developed.
In one sense, the economic philosophy behind copyright is the conviction that the 
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public 
welfare  (being  the  development  of  new  technologies  that  better  the  lives  of  the 
9 Halpern n ,1 295.  
10 D Tussey, ‘Technology Matters: The Courts, Media Neutrality, and New Technologies’ (2005) 12 
Journal International Property Law 427,  451.
11 Halpern n 1, 297.
12 Tussey n 9, 433.
13 J Ginsberg,  ‘Separating Sony sheep from Grokster (and Kazaa) goats: Reckoning future business 
plans of copyright-dependent technology entrepreneurs’ (2008) 19 AIPJ 10, 12.
14 H Tsai, ‘Media Neutrality in the Digital Era’ (2005) 5 Chi-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property  
Law 46
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general public).15 This ‘profit motive’16 is at the heart of copyright – as the ‘right to 
make copies’ usually leads to financial gain. The rationale is that the profit motive 
maintains the ‘engine that ensures the progress of science’.17
Once one recognises the existence of a ‘right to copy’ there very quickly develops a 
debate about the parameters of that right. What mediums deserve that right? How long 
does the right last? What exceptions are there? What are the limits? These questions 
have  been  (and  still  are) 18 quite  controversially  argued  between  the  three  major 
stakeholders that are affected by the ‘right to copy’: the inventor of a new technology, 
the existing rights holder, and the public who access content using new technology. 
The  subsequent  balance  achieved  between  these  three  competing  interests  is 
sometimes  called  the  fundamental compromise.19 The task  for  copyright  law is  to 
somehow implement this ‘fundamental compromise’ in a way that maximizes both 
the public and private good.20 Media neutrality is often seen as a tool through which to 
achieve the stakeholder balance demanded by the fundamental compromise.
Most implementation of media neutrality focuses on the protection of the rights holder 
by somewhat ignoring the underlying purpose of copyright: to offer a compromise 
balancing the interests of all stakeholders. This has led to a modern principle with two 
distinct features. On the one hand media neutral language is used in the rights-giving 
provisions of legislation and terms are construed broadly so as to protect content on 
new  technologies.  On  the  other,  the  bargaining  power  of  the  inventors  of  new 
technologies is limited by focusing on a consultation process that favours the interests 
of existing rights holders.21 It is this flawed use of the principle that has produced our 
rich,  complex  and  controversial  copyright  system.22 In  the  digital  context,  it  is 
particularly  important  that  media  neutrality  is  analysed  in  the  context  of  the 
fundamental  compromise.23 This  means  that  media  neutrality  somehow  needs  to 
operate  to  balance  the  rights  of  all  three  stakeholders,  not  merely  to  favour  the 
existing rights holder. The effect of this balanced application of media neutrality is 
that rights holders can exploit new technologies through broad ‘front-end’ provisions, 
whilst  similar  ‘back-end’  provisions  allow inventors  and the public  a  right  to  use 
content on that technology.
Legislative Developments
15 Halpern n 1,  303.
16  P Goldstein, ‘Copyright’s Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial Jukebox’ (2003) 21 (Revised 
Edition) Stanford University Press
17 Halpern n 1, 301.
18 J Ginsburg, ‘How Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself’. (2002) 26 (1) Columbia Journal of Law 
and Arts 1, 7.
19 L  Lessig, (2004) ‘Free Culture: The Nature and Future of Creativity’.  The Penguin Press. New 
York,  92.
20 Halpern n 1,  320.
21J  Litman, (2006) Digital Copyright: Protecting Intellectual Property on the Internet. Amherst, New 
York. Prometheus Books, 138.
22 Halpern n 1, 303.
23 J  Litman, ‘Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age’ (1996)  75 Orlando Law Review 19, 
21.
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Although the term ‘media neutrality’ is recent the problem of media neutrality has 
long history. As with almost all law at Federation, Australia’s copyright legislation 
mirrored that of the United Kingdom.24 The 1842 English legislation25 had not been 
amended to account  for leaps in technologies  independent of the ‘literary work’.26 
Sound recordings were a viable industry with the invention of the phonograph and 
piano  rolls,  the  cinema  was  becoming  a  popular  entertainment  medium  and 
photography was recognised as a commercial art form.
The first major copyright revision saw the introduction of  media specific provisions 
into both the front and back end – that is,  a ‘literary work’ was limited to literary 
material  in  a  novelistic  sense  and  did  not  consider  future  developments  in  other 
mediums.   Australia  waited  until  191227 when  Britain  finally  completed  a 
comprehensive  revision  of  copyright28 in  order  to  implement  effective  Australian 
legislation. The legislation was identical to its English cousin.29 Although the new Act 
purported to ‘broaden’ copyright in order to protect new types of works, it  did so 
through the use of more media-specific provisions rather than broader definitions of 
the existing terms. What was deemed to be a ‘literary work’ continued to be defined 
narrowly.30 Although this allowed the Act to accommodate the specific technologies 
of the day, it did not allow the Act to offer protection to future works. The legislation 
was designed so that Parliament would be the recourse for rights holders looking to 
protect their works on new mediums, rather than leaving it up to the discretion of the 
courts to narrowly or broadly construe media neutral provisions. The Courts regularly 
construed terms  in  the  1912 Act  as  being  limited  by dictionary  definitions31,  and 
despite various amendments rarely ventured beyond these boundaries.32
The second major copyright revision during the 1950s and 60s saw the introduction of 
limited  media neutral provisions into both the front and back end of the legislation. 
The Copyright Act 1968 introduced broader definitions than the law from 1912. The 
Act clarified  cinematograph films33,  sound recordings34 and  broadcasts35 (the latter 
was particularly important given the development of cable television as a challenge to 
conventional terrestrial television36). It offered a limited media neutral definition of 
24 Note particularly the Copyright Act 1842 (UK) and the International Copyright Act 1886 (UK)
25 Copyright Act 1842 (UK)
26 P Camina, (2002) Film Copyright in the European Union. Cambridge Press, 65.
27 Copyright Act 1912 (Cth).
28 Copyright  Commission (1878)  The Royal  Commissions and the Report  of  the  Commissioners:  
Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty (London).
29 Note that the Copyright Act 1911 (UK) formed a sizeable schedule to the 1912 Australian Act.
30 See s 35 (1) of the Copyright Act 1911 (UK).
31 Adelaide City Corporation v Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd [1928] ALR 127 at 131 
(Isaacs J).
32 Note that even as late as University of NSW v Moorhouse and Angus & Robertson Pty Ltd (1975) 
133 CLR 1 ‘authorisation’ was construed within the same dictionary-defined limits as  Adelaide City  
Corp above.
33 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 BD Johnston,  ‘Rethinking copyrights treatment  of  new technology:  strategic obsolescence as  a 
catalyst for interest group compromise’ (2009) 64 NYU Ann Surv Am L 165, 177.
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copy so  as  to  protect  works  in  different  forms.37 It  also  broadened  the  scope  of 
‘author’ beyond the traditional literary limitations.38
Yet for all its apparent scope-broadening provisions the Act did not adopt a broad 
media  neutral  doctrine  in  both  the  front  and  back  end.  Though  the  term ‘media 
neutrality’ would not be identified as a principle until the 1970s, the legislators were 
aware that the scope of the provisions needed adequate application in order to offer 
balance between the competing interests.39 Realising that they had only limited ‘media 
neutral’ scope in the rights-giving provisions of the Act, they understood that there 
needed to be back-end provisions that balanced this. Thus, they introduced three fair  
dealing exceptions  to  copyright  use.40 In  the  end  the  Act  wasn’t  entirely  media 
neutral, but it  was balanced between rights-giving and rights-limiting provisions (as 
both were limited in media-neutral scope).
The third major copyright revision occurred during the 1970s and saw the delicate 
balance  between the  front  and back end erode.  The Government  commissioned  a 
Committee led by Franki J to report  on the concerns.41 Largely influenced by the 
United States,42 the report delivered by the Franki Committee in 1973 suggested that 
broad, media neutral front and back end provisions should be introduced.43 When the 
government implemented the recommendations in 1980 there was little left of what 
the  Committee  had  originally  suggested.44 What  they  did  introduce  were  broader 
notions of ‘cinematograph films’  and various other  works45.  The final  amendment 
made no revision to the fair dealing provisions to similarly broaden their scope. This 
saw the front-end grow in media neutral scope.
The fourth significant revision to copyright saw this imbalance continue. In 1984 the 
legislature was forced to respond to the narrow reading of ‘literary work’ that had 
been made by the trial judge in  Computer Edge46 (in deciding to exclude computer 
programs  from copyright  protection).  The  amended  legislation  included  computer 
programs as ‘literary works’47 and was seen by some as an unnecessary surety – the 
Federal  Court  had  subsequently  overturned  the  trial  decision  and  read  computer 
programs as literary works.48 When the matter reached the High Court two years after 
37 Note that in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) (as passed) s 10, “‘copy’ … means any article or thing in 
which the visual images or sounds comprising the film are embodied”
38 Note that in s 10 and s 35 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) (as passed), s 35 states that ‘the author of 
a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work is the owner of any copyright subsisting in the work”
39 Report to Consider what Alterations are Desirable in the Copyright Law of the Commonwealth 
(1959) (the ‘Spicer Report’).
40 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 40-42.
41 G O'Donnell, (1977) People and authors' rights: The Franki Committee's "compulsory acquisition"  
copying scheme. Australian Copyright Council,  15.
42 Note  particularly  the  findings  of  the  Register’s  Report  on  the  General  Revision  of  the  U.S.  
Copyright Law (1961).
43 Copyright Law Committee on Reprographic Reproduction (1976) (the ‘Franki Report’).
44 Copyright Amendment Act 1980 (Cth).
45 Note for example s 110 of the Act (as passed).
46 Re Apple Computer Inc and Apple Computer Australia Pty Limited v Computer Edge Pty Limited  
and Michael Suss [1983] FCA 328.
47 Copyright Amendment (Computer Programs) Act 1984 (Cth).
48 Re Apple Computer Inc v Computer Edge Pty Ltd [1984] 53 ALR 225.
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the amendments the majority held that the Act prior to Amendment did not protect 
computer programs in this way.49 Shortly after this the Parliament introduced harsher 
penalties for copyright infringement and strong anti-piracy provisions in 1986.50 Thus, 
the rights-giving provisions (such as what was a literary work and what the penalty 
was for breaching copyright) was broadened, whilst the rights for users and inventors 
were tightened.
The fifth major phase for copyright revision came during a string of judicial decisions 
in  the  1990s.  In  Tape Manufacturers51 the  High Court  recognised  the  benefits  of 
media neutrality as it had been applied in the United States in Sony52 and in the United 
Kingdom in Amstrad.53 The Court in Sega read cinematograph films so as to include 
video games54 and the Court subsequently clarified the scope of computer programs in 
Data Access.55 The legislation itself was amended during this period so as to limit the 
copyright of journalistic works56 as well as to shift the burden of proof to defendants 
in  several  types  of  copyright  infringement  proceedings.57 Thus,  the  imbalance 
favouring existing rights holders grew and the back-end was narrowed.
These cases led to the sixth major revision of copyright law. The case law during the 
1990s led to the creation of the Copyright Convergence Group and their Discussion 
Paper,  Copyright  Reform and the Digital  Agenda,  which discussed various  WIPO 
Treaty  obligations  and very  broad,  media  neutral  rights.58 Their  recommendations 
were  introduced  with  a  2000  Amendment  to  the  Act.59 This,  and  particular 
amendments generated through the US Free Trade negotiations60, sought to allow the 
Act to ‘embrace much of the paraphernalia of modern society’.61 The definition of 
‘communicate’  was  broadened  to  cover  any  method  by  which  a  work  may  be 
distributed (whether invented or yet to be). Thus, the back-end provisions were further 
narrowed  and  the  rights  of  copyright  holders  (such  as  those  involving  anti-
circumvention  protection  measures,  as  well  as  space  and  time  shifting)  were 
extremely limited.
There was potential for a seventh major revision to copyright law in 2005 and it saw 
the first serious discussion of the back-end provisions. Rather than adopt broad, media 
neutral back-end provisions suggested by some studies62, the 2005 review of fair use 
49 Computer Edge Pty Ltd v Apple Computer Inc (1986) 65 ALR 33 at 185 (Gibbs CJ).
50 Copyright Amendment Act 1986 (Cth).
51 Australian Tape Manufacturers Association Ltd v Commonwealth (1993) 176 CLR 480 at 511.
52 Sony Corp of America v Universal City Studios, Inc (1984) 464 US 417.
53 CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics Plc [1988] AC 1013.
54 Galaxy Electronics Pty Ltd v Sega Enterprises Ltd (1997) 145 ALR 21 at 24.
55 Data Access Corporation v Powerflex Services Pty Ltd (1999) 202 CLR 1 at 52.
56 Copyright Amendment Act 1989 (Cth).
57 Copyright Amendment Act 1998 (No 2) (Cth).
58 Copyright  Convergence  Group.  Discussion  Paper:  Copyright  Reform  and  the  Digital  Agenda 
(1997).
59 Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000 (Cth).
60 US Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act 2005 (Cth).
61 J Litman, (2006) Digital Copyright: Protecting Intellectual Property on the Internet, Amherst, New 
York, Prometheus Books, 89.
62 See for example Submission to the Attorney-General’s Department in Response to the Fair Use and  
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suggested that specific space and format shifting exceptions be introduced.63 It has 
been argued that these provisions would lack ‘broad, forward-looking language’ and 
would merely be ‘narrow exceptions carved out of the copyright owners exclusive 
rights’.64 Australian Courts have noted this troubling imbalance and have argued that 
their purpose is to restrict the front-end provisions, rather than broadening the back-
end. Gibbs CJ in Computer Edge admitted that ‘it would be no doubt right to give the 
Copyright Act a liberal interpretation’ however it ‘would not be justifiable to depart 
altogether from its language…in an attempt to protect the products of…technological 
developments which were not contemplated…when the statute was enacted’.65 And 
this ambiguity continues to permeate the Act.
The language used to describe cinematograph films in s 86(c) of the Act anticipates 
the  use  of  film as  the  medium  to  create  the  content.66 It  has  already  been 
recommended that the true media neutral definition of this type of work should be 
termed ‘audiovisual work’.67 The current Act somewhat overcomes this limitation via 
a broad construction of what it takes to ‘communicate [the work] to the public’.68 Of 
course, this is a rather clear example when compared to literary work collections69 and 
television broadcasts70. The latter is ironically described in s 87 as including the right 
to communicate the broadcast ‘otherwise than by broadcasting it’.71
When one considers that there is an imbalance between broad media neutral front-end 
provisions and media specific back-end, and that the Courts have recognised this and 
attempted to artificially construe this balance, the jurisprudence generated from the 
leading cases is marred by confusion. As recently as  Ten Network v Nine the Court 
unhelpfully concluded that ‘a Court is permitted to have regard to the words of the 
legislature  in  their  legal  and  historical  context,  and  in  appropriate cases,  give  a 
meaning that will give effect to  any purpose of the legislation that can be deduced 
from that context’.72 The problem with this is that it  means that whether copyright 
protection is afforded to a work is determined subjectively by the Courts rather than 
objectively by the legislation. Copyright, by its very nature needs to be relatively clear 
when the work is created and taken to market. Otherwise when a business model is 
employed and a work exploited a Court has the authority to later find that the work is 
not entitled to protection.
Welcome to the world of media neutral confusion.
Other Copyright Exceptions Issues Paper 2005 submitted by Apple Computer Inc.
63 Attorney  General’s  Department,  Department,  Issues  Paper:  Fair  Use  and  Other  Copyright  
Exceptions: An examination of fair use, fair dealing and other exceptions. (May 2005), 4.
64 Above n 35 at 221.
65 Computer Edge Pty Ltd v Apple Computer Inc (1986) 65 ALR 33 at 42 (Gibbs CJ).
66 See Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10 for the definition of ‘cinematograph film’.
67 The notion of the ‘audiovisual work’ was also considered by the High Court in Network Ten Pty Ltd 
v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (2004) 205 ALR 1.
68 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10.
69 See s 44 of the 1968 Act.
70 See s 87 of the 1968 Act.
71 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 87 (c).
72 Network Ten Pty Ltd v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (2004) 205 ALR 1 at 4, describing the finding in 
Newcastle City Council v GIO General Ltd (1997) 191 CLR 85 (emphasis added).
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How have the courts dealt with past technologies?
It’s  (somewhat)  simple  to  outline  the  legislative  developments  and  squeeze  the 
developments into the theory suggested by this paper: that media neutral language is 
not, but should be, used in both the front and back end of the legislation. The more 
difficult  task is to figure out whether the Courts have found this  to be much of a 
problem at all – and if they have – whether the Courts are already equipped to deal 
with the problems of the imbalance.
Commentators  have  continually  reiterated  that  ‘copyright  was  technology’s  child 
from  the  start’73 and  that  as  such  it  should  not  be  seen  to  exert  control  over 
technological  development.  Rather,  it  should  be  informed by  technological 
development. Below we look at the advent of film as it challenged theatre owners and 
the accommodation  of video games as cinematograph films in  Sega.  We can also 
appreciate how the early copyright legislation struggled to grapple with the advent of 
piano rolls and player pianos in White-Smith and in Boosey. Further, we look into the 
struggle to accommodate computer programs as literary works in Computer Edge.
Video Games as Films
When film first became popular in the early twentieth century the copyright system 
was far from capable of accommodating the new subject matter. In Germany the early 
thinking was that (because of the use of complicated film projection equipment) film 
should  be  protected  as  a  ‘mechanical  work’  in  much  the  same  way  that  patents 
currently protect mechanical design.74 In the United States the Courts determined that 
because films operated with reels of 24 frames per second, each frame was copyright 
protected as a photograph under the 1909 Act.75 Most films of this era ran for forty 
minutes  or  less so as  far as  copyright  was concerned a  film consisted of  at  least 
58,000 individual  photographs.  Congress  was forced to  amend the  Act  to  include 
films  in  1912.76 Britain  (and  hence  Australia)  created  the  specific  provision  for 
protection of ‘dramatic works’.77
The interest is not so much in the specific category through which film was adopted 
(as an ‘audiovisual work’ in the US78 or as a ‘dramatic work’ in Britain and Australia) 
but the way in which the legislation was structured in order to balance the interests of 
stakeholders at this fork in the road. Due to the brevity of the American rights-giving 
provision Congress chose not to limit the fair use doctrine enunciated in  Folsom v 
Marsh.79 In the US this resulted in a broad statutory front-end (rights giving provision 
covering all ‘audiovisual works’) balanced by a broad common law back-end (fair use 
doctrine). This balance allowed subsequent developments – television, Betamax, VHS 
73 P Goldstein, ‘Copyrights highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial Jukebox’ (2003) 21 (Revised 
Edition) Stanford University Press, 34.
74 P Camina, (2002) Film copyright in the European Union. Cambridge Press, 77.
75 Copyright Act 1909 (US).
76 Copyright Amendment Act 1912 (US).
77 Copyright Act 1911 (UK), Copyright Act 1912 (Cth).
78 Copyright Act 1909 (US).
79 Folsom v Marsh 9 F Cas 342, 347 (1841) (Justice Joseph Story).
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and DVD – to be easily subsumed into copyright  law with little,  if  any,  need for 
statutory amendment. In Britain and Australia (along with Canada, Singapore, New 
Zealand  and  South  Africa)  the  media  specific  rights-giving  provision  providing 
protection for ‘dramatic works’ was offset by limits to that right (such as s 41A80). 
Again, this allowed (though in a much more narrow scope) the accommodation of 
new technologies and new concerns affecting the balance between stakeholders.
When videogames arrived on the market this fragile balance had shifted. The US had 
very broad legislative  front  and back-end as  of  1976.81 Australia  had many more 
media specific rights-giving provisions and the introduction of specific fair dealing 
exceptions as of 1968.82 Most of the former Commonwealth countries adopted similar 
provisions between 1956 and 1988.
The question of how effective this  balance worked was put to the test  in  Galaxy  
Electronics v Sega Enterprises in 1997.83 The question was whether videogames came 
within  the  ambit  of  copyright  protection  outlined  in  s  10  and  s  24  covering 
‘cinematograph films’84. The only way for the Court to read videogames in such a 
way was to adopt a media neutral approach to the definition of film. Justice Wilcox 
held  (Lockhart  J  agreeing85)  that  ‘it  would  be  wrong  to  interpret  narrowly  the 
definition of “cinematograph film”’86 and that the Act was ‘intended to cover new 
technologies’.87 Key to his media neutral analysis was the finding that the emphasis 
should  be  ‘on  the  end  product…rather  than  the  means  adopted  to  create  those 
pictures’.88 However, Wilcox J qualified this reading by finding that ‘the definition 
will apply to any particular new technology only if that technology satisfies the words 
of the definition, liberally read’.89 The Court recognised that the trial judge, Burchett 
J, was correct in finding that ‘the legislative history shows Parliament intended to take 
a broad view in relation to copyright in a film and not to tie the copyright to any 
particular technology'.90
The Court came to such a balanced conclusion by refusing to look at  the specific 
computational  method  of  producing  images  or  how  the  user  interacted  with  the 
content, instead Wilcox J offered a novel solution that if one looked to the potential 
pirate one would see that ‘the copier could place a video camera in front of the game 
screen and video the images that appeared during the course of a game [and that] the 
resultant video film would comprise only that game; it would reflect the player input 
80 Copyright Act 1911 s 41A – outlining that one cannot make a threat as the copyright owner without  
cause.
81 Copyright Act 1976 (US).
82 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 40-41, s 41A (the satire and parody provision) was added later.
83 (1997) 145 ALR 21.
84 Note that in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10 defines the parameters of the cinematograph film and 
s 24 concerns ‘sounds and visual images embodied in an article or thing’.
85 Galaxy Electronics Pty Ltd v Sega Enterprises Ltd (1997) 145 ALR 21 at 22.
86 Ibid 22 (Wilcox J).
87 Ibid  24 (Wilcox J).
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid  31 (Wilcox J).
90 Sega Enterprises Ltd v Galaxy Electronics Pty Ltd (1996) 35 IPR 161 at 165 (Burchett J)
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of that particular game’.91
However, by the time the Court came to decide Australian Video Retailers the Court 
was reluctant to broaden the scope of the definition of ‘computer programs’ where 
DVDs were concerned.92 This is most likely because the Digital Agenda Amendment  
significantly shifted the balance between stakeholders in the copyright spectrum. If 
we turn to the current legislative scope outlined above we can see that this balance has 
shifted  significantly  from  what  it  was  when  video  games  were  comfortably 
accommodated within the scope of the film provision (1997).
Piano Rolls
An Australian Court has never directly considered piano rolls or player pianos. Our 
remoteness,  limited  technology (until  relatively  recently),  shipping delays  and our 
observance of English common law has resulted in no Australian Court ever needing 
to rule on the potential copyright infringement of piano rolls. However, Australian 
Courts in their exploration of computer programs and films have heavily drawn upon 
the developments of the English and American Courts and their respective discussions 
of  piano  rolls.  The  complexity  of  the  cases,  the  issues  they  consider,  and  their 
continued relevance to Australian Courts is why it is essential to consider the cases 
which dealt with player pianos, despite them being non-Australian cases.
The issue first came to a head in the English case of Boosey and reared its head again 
in the American case of White-Smith. The late 19th century saw the first challenge to 
copyright with the advent of player pianos and piano rolls. Up until then, in order to 
hear a musical piece, one needed to attend a live performance or purchase sheet music 
and play the piece on a piano. Piano rolls were developed in order to allow pianos to 
play automatically, reading rolls of paper with notches indicating various piano notes. 
The developers of the technology and subsequent business markets that sold piano 
rolls paid no royalty to the original composers of the music.93
In 1899 the English Courts were asked in  Boosey v Whight whether this constituted 
infringement.94 The question was then posed to the American Courts in 1908 in the 
case of White-Smith Music Publishing v Apollo.95 Neither in the US nor Britain was 
the Court willing to extend the rights of the copyright owner to cover the use of the 
piano roll.  The  Courts  read  the  definition  of  what  constituted  a  ‘copy’  under  the 
respective Copyright Acts as being incapable of including technologies beyond the 
scope of the original work.96 Thus, even though the melody played by the piano roll 
was identical to that which was transcribed by composers in their sheet music, the 
definition of copy was media specific and could not accommodate new technologies. 
Prima  facie,  the  legislation  (being  medium specific)  favoured  the  interests  of  the 
91 Galaxy Electronics Pty Ltd v Sega Enterprises Ltd (1997) 145 ALR 21 at 30 (Wilcox J).
92 Australian Video Retailers Assoc’n v Warner Home Video Pty Ltd (2001) 114 FCR 324 at 326.
93 Boosey v Whight [1900] 1 Ch 122.
94 Ibid.
95 White-Smith Music Publishing Co v Apollo Co 209 US 1 (1908).
96 D Tussey, ‘Technology Matters: The Courts, Media Neutrality, and New Technologies’ (2005) 12 
Journal of Intellectual Property Law 427, 438.
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inventors of new technologies. The emerging piano roll industry argued that ‘the only 
rights afforded to the copyright owner [were] those set out in the statute’. 97 The Court 
in both jurisdictions agreed. This was a concern raised by counsel in Sega and Wilcox 
J acknowledged that everything begins with the rights afforded by the statute.98
Intense lobbying of Congress in the United States and Parliament in Britain led to the 
1909 and 1911 Copyright Acts respectively.  These new Acts marked an interesting 
innovation,  providing  copyright  owners  with  ‘the  exclusive  right  to  produce  any 
mechanical  device capable of recreating the sounds of the musical  composition’.99 
Post-amendment the legislation appeared to favour the interests of existing copyright 
holders. However, the legislation in both jurisdictions recognised that if they were 
going to  put  in  place  a  scheme for  the protection  of  existing  content  on the new 
technologies  then there  needed to  be sufficient  back-end to offer  public  uses  and 
exploitation rights for inventors. ‘Compulsory licences’ were adopted (including in 
Australia)  to  offer  a  reprieve  for  these  other  stakeholders.100 These  licences  were 
media specific.
Thus, what resulted were media specific front-end provisions capable of protecting 
content on some new technologies,  but back-end compulsory licences  which were 
similarly designed with media specific focus so as to provide sufficient balance for 
the other stakeholders. It may not have been perfect, but it worked.
Computer programs
It is often frustrating for those writing in the field of Australian copyright discourse to  
offer  an Australian-specific  analysis  of contemporary issues.101 Often many of  the 
interesting issues that confront copyright – VHS recording of programs,102 transfer of 
music from CD to a hard disk103 – are engaged in the United States Courts long before 
Australia  has  the opportunity to  discuss the issues.  This  often leads  to  Australian 
lawmakers  changing  legislation  to  reflect  changes  in  the  United  States  before 
Australian  Courts  have  ever  engaged  the  issue.104 Though  there  may  be  little  to 
criticize of this pro-active approach, it frustrates judicial discourse in the area as much 
of the analysis must engage with hypothetical Australian cases105 or be grounded upon 
97 White-Smith Music Publishing Co v Apollo Co 209 US 1 (1908).
98 Note that  in  Galaxy Electronics  Pty Ltd v Sega Enterprises  Ltd (1997) 145 ALR 21  Wilcox J 
discusses ‘Moonlight Sonata’ as being read within the bounds of the statute so as not to come to an 
illogical  conclusion that  might  result  in  every piano playing Moonlight  Sonata being classed as  a 
‘sound recording’.
99 B  Johnston,  ‘Rethinking  copyrights  treatment  of  new  technology:  strategic  obsolescence  as  a 
catalyst for interest group compromise’ (2009) 64 NYU Ann Surv Am L 165, 170.
100 Ibid 171.
101 See the need for analysis of American jurisprudence in J Ginsberg,  ‘Separating Sony sheep from 
Grokster  (and  Kazaa)  goats:  Reckoning  future  business  plans  of  copyright-dependent  technology 
entrepreneurs’ (2008) 19 AIPJ 10,  12.
102 Sony Corp of America v Universal City Studios Inc 464 US 417 (1984).
103 Recording Industry Association of America v Diamond Multimedia System Inc 180 F3d 1072 (9th 
Circuit 1999).
104 Note that the most profound examples being the Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000 
(Cth) and the US Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act 2005 (Cth).
105 In  Galaxy Electronics Pty Ltd v Sega Enterprises Ltd (1997) 145 ALR 21 Wilcox J is forced to 
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American cases.106
With the development of broadband technologies Australia has been forced to engage 
many  of  the  issues  before  its  western  counterpart  (especially  in  P2P  software 
distribution  cases107 and  ISP  secondary  liability  for  P2P  infringement  cases).108 
However,  when  Australia  was  confronted  with  one  of  the  earliest  instances  of 
software piracy it found itself unable to rely on the developments from its western 
brethren – and was forced in  Computer Edge v Apple to offer its own analysis  of 
whether computer programs constituted a ‘literary work’.109 In many other common 
law nations the decisions involving computer programs were seen in the context of 
the copyright developments in the revised Berne Convention.110 This was not the case 
in Australia.
Early judicial  discussion was limited almost exclusively to the idea that ‘a literary 
work is intended to afford either information and instruction, or pleasure, in the form 
of literary enjoyment’.111 The trial judge in Computer Edge held that there was no way 
in which one could logically read the definition of literary work so as to include a 
computer  program.  This  was  despite  decisions  at  the  same  time  in  Britain112, 
Canada113, South Africa114 and the United States115 that had found otherwise. In the 
Federal Court of Appeal there was a reversal. The Court held that the source  and 
object programs were literary works within the meaning of s 32 of the Act.116 The 
Court recognised the limits of the definition and artificially constructed the Act to 
read that object code was an adaptation of the source code (which even the trial judge 
had  reluctantly  held  to  be  a  literary  work).117 It  was  far  from  textbook  media 
neutrality, but the Court used media neutral construction of the ‘adaptation’ provision 
in order to accommodate the object code of the computer program.
After  the Appeal  decision the  legislature  stepped in  and confirmed that  computer 
programs were literary works in the Copyright Amendment (Computer Programs) Act 
1984.118 However, the subsequent Appeal to the High Court was heard in the context 
of the Act prior to the Amendment.
In a scathing review of the Federal Court of Appeal, Brennan J held that an object 
program was ‘neither a literary work nor any other kind of work and was therefore not 
engage the hypothetical ‘Moonlight Sonata’ problem.
106 In Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment v Stevens [2003] FCAFC 157 the Full Federal 
Court relied on video game piracy as it had been engaged by American Courts.
107 Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd (2005) 65 IPR 289.
108 Roadshow Films v iiNet (2010) 263 ALR 215.
109 Re Apple Computer Inc v Computer Edge Pty Ltd [1984] 53 ALR 225.
110 Note the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works was amended on 28 
September 1979 to accommodate computer programs as literary works.
111 Hollinrake v Truswell [1894] 3 Ch 420 at 441.
112 Sega Enterprises Ltd v Richards [1983] FSR 73.
113 IMB Corporation v Ordinateurs Spirales Inc (1984) 80 CPR (2d) 187.
114 Northern Micro Computers v Rosenstein [1982] FSR 124.
115 Apple Computer Inc v Franklin Computer Corporation (1983) 714 F 2d 1240.
116 Re Apple Computer Inc v Computer Edge Pty Ltd [1984] 53 ALR 225 at 226.
117 Ibid 241.
118 Copyright Amendment (Computer Programs) Act 1984 (Cth).
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a “work that is an adaptation” of the source program’.119 Further, Deane J firmly held 
that  there  was  no  method  of  reading  ‘an  object  program  [as]  a  reproduction  or 
adaptation’.120 The  majority  agreed,  Gibbs  CJ  even finding  that  ‘in  the  case  of  a 
literary work, the expression must be in print or writing’.121 Given the similarity to 
Boosey Gibbs CJ noted that  he ‘regretted that the respondents have no remedy in 
copyright  against  the  appellants  who pirated  their  programs’.122 The  Chief  Justice 
even went on to admit that:
Although it would no doubt be right to give the Copyright Act a liberal 
interpretation,  it  would not  be justifiable  to  depart  altogether  from its 
language and principles in an attempt to protect the products of scientific 
and technological developments which were not contemplated,  or only 
incompletely understood, when the statute was enacted.123
In  effect  he  had  followed  the  law  to  what  seemed  like  an  illogical  conclusion 
(allowing piracy to go unpunished). Even with his judicial activist hat on Gibbs CJ 
could not bring himself to leap beyond the common connotation of the word ‘literary’. 
He concluded that ‘important questions of policy arise when it becomes necessary to 
consider whether copyright protection should be extended to such a thing…and the 
Courts can act only within the existing statutory framework’.124 The decision of the 
Chief Justice indicated that where the judiciary saw no scope to read words in their 
most liberal, media neutral sense, then it was a matter to be left to the legislature.
The dissent from Mason and Wilson JJ in Computer Edge supported the finding of the 
Appeals  Court.  They  reiterated  that  programs  may  be  ‘entitled  to  protection  as 
adaptations  of  the  original  literary  works’.125 They  relied  upon  the  media  neutral 
analysis  undertaken  by the  House  of  Lords  in  Anderson v  Lieber  Code Co.  The 
English Court there had held that a telegraphic code where the words themselves were 
meaningless could still constitute a literary work.126
Despite (and perhaps because of) this apparent disregard for the broad principle of 
media neutrality the decision has come under scrutiny from the High Court recently. 
In Ten v Nine the majority rejected an ‘artificially narrow construction of the phrase 
“a  television  broadcast”’  in  s  87  of  the  Act.127 In  Stevens  v  Sony128 the  majority 
affirmed the use of a “principle of media neutrality” that was identified in the United 
States in Sony Corp of America129 and further identified the usefulness of the ‘staple 
article of commerce doctrine’.130 Stevens is perhaps the only Australian decision to 
119 Computer Edge Pty Ltd v Apple Computer Inc (1986) 65 ALR 33 at 50 (Brennan J).
120 Ibid 59 (Deane J).
121 Ibid 35 (Gibbs CJ).
122 Ibid 38 (Gibbs CJ).
123 Ibid 40 (Gibbs CJ).
124 Ibid 42 (Gibbs CJ).
125 Ibid 49 (Wilson J, Mason J agreed).
126 DP Anderson & Co Ltd v Lieber Code Co [1917] 2 KB 469.
127 Network Ten Pty Ltd v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (2004) 205 ALR 1 at 19.
128 Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment (2005) 221 ALR 448 at 499.
129 Sony Corporation of America v Universal City Studios Inc 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
130 Note that the Staple Article of Commerce doctrine was a concept that the American Court in Sony 
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articulate  the  fully  balanced  notion  of  the  principle  of  media  neutrality,  in  that  a 
decision grounded in media neutrality is one which is:
strongly protective of new technology [and] foreshadows the dramatic 
evolution of a product’s market. It respects the limitations facing judges 
where matters  of complex and novel technology are concerned [and] 
avoids the introduction of a “chill of technological development” in the 
name of responding to copyright infringement.’131
This was further enunciated in  iiNet where the majority concluded that ‘the Court’s 
preference in the circumstances is to take a broad approach’.132
The Court in  Computer Edge, in opting to limit media neutral interpretation of the 
literary work provision, made one of the most profound decisions in the spectrum of 
media neutrality.  Despite the addition of computer programs into the ambit  of the 
Copyright Act in 1984 and a short amendment in 1986 rewording the fair  dealing 
provisions133 there was very little  change until  the Digital  Agenda Amendment  in 
2000. We saw previously that the Act in 1997 was able to safely accommodate video 
games as films and we further identified that this was because there was a balance 
between  limited media  neutral  front-end and  limited media  neutral  back end (fair 
dealing  and  other  exceptions).   This  produced  a  result  that  largely  balanced  the 
interests of copyright stakeholders. If the Act as assessed by the Court in  Computer  
Edge was so similar to that assessed in  Sega why are the results so different? Why 
does the Act accommodate one technological evolution, but not another?
The solution applied to past technologies
It  appears  that  where  balance  exists  between  the  front  and  back-end  provisions, 
whether they are media neutral or not, there will exist a relatively balanced procedure 
for accounting for the interests of the three major stakeholders in copyright. I suggest 
that where the front and back end provisions are limited in media neutral language and 
definition then the legislature will need to step in from time to time in order to include 
technologies where a development is without any analogy.
It is here that our reflection on past technology offers three potential solutions to new 
technologies.
(1) Media specific front and back end provisions that will need to be amended by 
the legislature with each subsequent technological development (Piano Rolls).
(2) Limited media  neutral  front  and  back  end provisions  that  will  need  to  be 
amended  by  the  legislature  from  time  to  time  when  technology  makes 
significant leaps (computer programs, video games).
Corp borrowed from the law of patents. The doctrine declares that a technology that is capable of 
significant legal use cannot be deemed to be illegal merely because it can be used for purposes that 
may infringe copyright. This has been a concept touched upon by recent Australian cases.
131 Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment (2005) 221 ALR 448 at 499.
132 Roadshow Films v iiNet (2010) 263 ALR 215 at 279.
133 Copyright Amendment Act 1986 (Cth).
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(3) Unlimited media neutral front and back end provisions that very rarely need to 
be amended by the legislature and the scope of which is determined almost 
exclusively by the judiciary.
Given that the current copyright landscape offers an imbalance that fails to fall into 
any of these three categories the next issue is how significant the need for change is.
How will the courts deal with emerging technologies?
In order to properly understand the challenges facing modern copyright we need to 
assess burgeoning technological developments and their use of content, not merely 
those challenges engaged in more than twenty years ago when the computer industry 
first exploded onto the market. Further, because media neutrality itself holds no bias 
towards particular technologies then an analysis  of future technologies should also 
hold no bias. This means that we should focus on understanding the different types of 
technologies rather than the technologies themselves. New technologies can thus be 
divided into three distinct categories: those which present new subject matter, those 
which  offer  new  media  of  fixation,  and  those  which  provide  new  means  of 
exploitation.  These  categories  are  not  closed  and  there  is  significant  cross-over 
between some categories.
What follows is a discussion of how and why the previous solutions employed may 
fail  to  properly  alleviate  the  imbalance  caused by the  current  Act  in  the  face  of 
emerging technologies.
New Subject Matter
Broadband Internet has led to the development of user-centric content (‘UCC’, being 
websites which aggregate news from various sources as occurs with Google News) 134 
and user-generated content (‘UGC’, whether it be on Facebook, YouTube or more 
recently Twitter).  These developments  pose significant  challenges  to broad,  media 
neutral interpretation of copyright legislation.
The Courts  may find that  in  some instances  much of the material  posted to user-
generated portals is capable of protection as a literary work because there may be 
‘sufficient effort of a literary nature’.135 In other cases, and in light of  Telstra,136 the 
Court  may  find  that  content  aggregated  on  news  websites  does  not  qualify  for 
protection as a compilation and perhaps breaches the copyright of the original author 
of an article. This means that aggregate news websites may be violating the rights of 
the  original  publishers  of  news  articles  by generating  their  list  entirely  from pre-
created  content.137 This  is  far  from  a  novel  hypothetical.  In  the  United  States 
publishers have pressured the Federal  Trade Commission to  rule that  republishing 
excerpts from articles in this way contravenes copyright138 and a number of major 
134 Other sites include Bing! News and Yahoo News.
135 IceTV Pty Ltd v Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd [2009] 254 ALR 386 at 411.
136 Telstra Corp Ltd v Phone Directories Company Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 44.
137 N Anderson, ‘Is permission needed to retweet hot news?’ Ars Technica. (6th April 2010) (Available 
at: http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/04/is-permission-needed-to-retween-hot-news.ars).
138 S Desanti, (Chair) [Transcript] Federal Trade Commission: Policy Planning Workshop (7 March 
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newspapers are creating user agreements that purport to outlaw the reproduction of 
news article titles.139
A number of Australian bodies have attempted to offer guidance in this area. The 
Australian Copyright Council firmly argues that UGC is protected by copyright as a 
‘literary  work’  unless  it  is  too  short.140 The  University  of  Queensland  actually 
indicates to students that the provisions were not intended ‘to directly cover web 2.0’ 
and that ‘the law has been slow to adapt to how people use copyright material’ in the 
digital  age.141 Further,  the  Australian  Digital  Alliance  and  the  Australian  Library 
Information Association have indicated to members of their organisations that content 
is most likely regulated by End User Licence Agreements which purport to transfer 
copyright to the company running the technology.142 It is evident that even the major 
bodies involved in copyright on a regular basis have yet to come to a consensus on 
how UGC is protected.
Looking at the legislation itself, the Copyright Act seeks to promote the ‘exploitation 
of new online technologies’143 and to ‘promote access to copyright material online’.144 
Whilst the object of the Act is clearly stated, the scope of the provisions that one 
would consider UGC to be within lack similar clarity.
Literary works have been defined to include maps, charts, and computer programs145 
and the Court in IceTV asked themselves whether ‘slivers of information themselves 
[could] be classified as original literary works’.146 The Court went on to find that 
‘literary works’ require a semblance of ‘sufficient skill and labour’.147 Whether UGC 
satisfies these elements is entirely a question of fact. Supposing that the content  is 
protected as a literary work, how do the current fair dealing provisions and numerous 
exceptions offer the broad use that the nature of the content requires? The fair dealing 
exceptions  relevant  may  be  criticism  and  review148 or  the  reporting  of  news.149 
However, this would mean that when UGC and UCC are reposted without permission 
on another site (which is common), it would have to be done within the parameters of 
these fair dealing provisions.
Suppose that a user posts on Twitter an account of their experience during the Haiti 
earthquake:  do  they  own  copyright  in  the  160  characters  typed?  What  if  that  is 
2010) <Available at: htc-01.media.globix.net/COMP008760MOD1/ftc_web/transcripts/030910_sess1>
139 H Tabuchi,  ‘Nikkei restricts links to its  new website’.  The New York Times.  (8th April 2010) 
<Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/09/technology/09paper.html?ref=business>.
140 Australian Copyright Council, Information Sheet: User-Generated Content and Web 2.0 websites. 
(March 2009).
141 A Austin, (2009) Blog, Podcast, Vodcast and Wiki: Copyright Guide for Australia. University of 
Queensland, p 7.
142 M McAllister, ‘From illuminated manuscript to iPod: Copyright Problems in the Digital Age’. 
inCite Vol 26 Issue 12 (December 2007), 3.
143 Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000 (Cth) s 3(a)(ii).
144 Ibid s 3(a)(iii).
145 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10.
146 IceTV Pty Ltd v Nine Network Australia (2009) 254 ALR 386 at 387.
147 Ibid.
148 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 40.
149 Ibid s 42.
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reposted by hundreds of news outlets? Is this valid use of the fair dealing provision? 
The following was posted in January 2010 and subsequently reported by dozens of 
news entities:
Consulted [the FirstAid iPhone app] while trapped under Hotel Montana in 
Haiti  earthquake,  to  treat  excessive  bleeding and shock.  Helped me stay 
alive till I was rescued 64 hours later.150
It  is  up  for  debate  whether  the  post  qualifies  as  a  literary  work  –  certainly  it  is 
original, but our copyright legislation is not determined by originality – the question is 
whether it is a ‘literary work in which copyright subsists’151 based on the elements 
outlined above. If it is, it has certainly been published152, but what of the reposting on 
news websites (or to complicate matters even more, on an aggregate news website)? 
Is this within the ambit of fair dealing? Given narrow construction it may not be. Even 
if one were to attempt to utilize the as yet  undefined s 200AB153 (the ‘social  use’ 
provision) the Court would be forced to assess each posting of content on its own 
facts to determine whether the use of copyright material was ‘socially useful’ in the 
circumstances.  Unfortunately,  although the  potential  to  offer  sufficient  fair  use  to 
UCC in Australia was recognised by the Federal Court of Appeal in IceTV (drawing 
upon Hill J in Skybase), 154 the High Court subsequently dismissed the ‘fair use’ idea 
that a person ‘may rework the work of a plaintiff, capturing the ideas used or facts…
in a way that does not infringe’ copyright.155
Not only does this identify the problem of a narrow back-end, it also illuminates a 
problem with the medium-centric focus of the front-end provisions of the Act. There 
is only limited focus on originality as the determinative factor in offering copyright to 
a  user-generated  work156 -  so  for  all  it’s  media  neutral  ambitions,  the  Act  is  still 
limited to the term ‘literary works’.
The major problem we have identified here is that user-centric content is by its nature 
used  commonly  in  a  way that  appears  to  breach traditional  copyright  boundaries. 
Most of the uses (reposting content, aggregating news headlines, user posts on social 
networking sites) require a wider permitted use of copyright material  than the law 
currently allows. Businesses have stepped in to define limited free use in Terms of 
Use agreements so that the content posted by users is protected within broad free-use 
boundaries157. However, more recently a number of popular user-centric sites (such as 
150 A Moses, ‘Haiti Survivor: Saved by first-aid iPhone app’.  Sydney Morning Herald. (21 January 
2010). It was published as a review on iTunes and later ‘re-tweeted’ on Twitter.
151 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 189.
152 There are no limits placed upon the term ‘published’ under s 33 (2) of the Copyright Act 1968
153 Note that under s 200AB it is a full defence to infringement if the use can be classed as a ‘special  
case’ (defined in the TRIPs Agreement).
154 Skybase Nominees Pty Ltd v Fortuity Pty Ltd (1996) 36 IPR 529 at 532 (Hill J with whom French J 
agreed).
155 IceTV Pty Ltd v Nine Network Australia (2009) 254 ALR 386 at 390.
156 Note that  ‘originality’ is  paramount  in the United States,  see  Galoob Toys Inc v Nintendo of  
America Inc (1992) 964 F 2d 965 (9th Circuit).
157 Note for example the challenging privacy issues raised around Facebook.
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Facebook) 158 have begun to claim copyright in the material posted by users (if only 
for a  limited  period of time).  Until  copyright  law steps in to  clarify the limits  of 
copyright in UCC the business models will continue to use (and in some instances 
abuse) the content of its users.
New Media of Fixation
Looking back upon the history of copyright, the type of problem one would assume to 
be the simplest to comprehend is when new mediums of fixation are introduced (for 
example, from vinyl records to tape then to CD and to iPod). However, the problem 
can  become  very  complicated  when looking  at  the  growth  of  cloud-based  digital 
media. There is no doubt that the general public underestimates just how fast cloud-
based computing will grow. Cloud computing is core to the web 2.0 experience. It is a 
system whereby users can stream content from a central server without necessarily 
keeping a permanent copy of their files on the hard disk of the computer they use to  
access  the  content.159 Most  web-based  email  clients  are  considered  to  be  early 
representations  of  cloud  computing  technologies.  Before  any analysis  begins  it  is 
apparent that a technology that does not employ any constant, ‘fixed’ medium poses a 
problem for copyright which still relies on notions of ‘storage’ and ‘embodiment’. 
An ideal example is the revolutionary platform developed by Valve, a cloud-based 
video  game  distribution  system  known  as  Steam.160 Video  games  are  currently 
protected under the definition of cinematograph films in the Act.161 The games under 
the Steam system will soon be streamed directly to a users computer or console – so 
that there will be no physical media (such as a disc or hard drive) on which the game 
is  permanently  stored.  However,  the Act  requires  that  a  film be ‘embodied  in  an 
article or thing’.162 The whole (‘the aggregate of visual images’) 163 of the video game 
will at no point be embodied on the users console and only the segment relevant to the 
point-in-time enjoyment of the game is present in the RAM module - and the RAM 
alone is not capable of constituting the ‘reproduction in material form’.164 Even if one 
applies the liberal interpretation of the embodiment principle in s 24 as the Court did 
in  Sega (finding that the provision is designed so as not to be read narrowly)  165 the 
requirement  of  the  embodiment  of  the  content  on  any  article  or  thing  cannot  be 
ignored.  The  game  itself  exists  on  a  server  (often  multiple  servers)  thousands  of 
kilometers away. Suppose that the game exists on a swarm of servers from various 
locations, constantly alternating with the broadband demands of users. In Sharman the 
High Court noted that the swarm of servers involved in P2P networks fell outside the 
158 See the Statement of Rights and Responsibilities at http://www.facebook.com/terms.php?ref=pf
159 C Foresman, ‘Heavenly jukebox: cloud distribution and the future of film’. Ars Technica. (2 April 
2010)  <Can  be  found  at:  arstechnica.com/media/news/2010/04/the-cloud-gives-independent-film-a-
wider-audience-for-less-money-ready-to-edit.ars>.
160 A Webster, ‘The future of gaming: up the beanstalk and into the cloud’.  Ars Technica. (5 April 
2010) <Can be found at: arstechnica.com/business/future-of-cloud/2010/04/cloud-gaming.ars>.
161 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10.
162 Ibid.
163 Ibid.
164 Australian Video Retailers Association v Warner Home Video Pty Ltd (2001) 114 FCR 324 at 341.
165 Galaxy Electronics Pty Ltd v Sega Enterprises Ltd (1997) 145 ALR 21 at 22.
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ambit of copyright because there was no embodiment of an entire file on a central 
server.166 If  the  Courts  took  a  similar  approach  there  would  be  a  challenge  to 
considering a game existing in the ‘cloud’ as being embodied on an article or thing.
Suppose that this is enough of an embodiment to foster protection for the video game 
– what of piracy? If the practice of piracy adopts the streaming platform then at no 
point is there a sufficient ‘copy’ of the game as defined by the Act to constitute the 
user  making an ‘infringing copy’  of the cinematograph film.167 Perhaps the Court 
would be willing to read the temporary RAM storage as a copy so that streaming 
piracy is successfully classed as being covered as an ‘infringing copy’. However, if 
storage in  RAM is  classified  as  a  copy then this  has  significant  ramifications  for 
digital media and computer programs.
In Australian Video Retailers the majority held that the ‘ephemeral embodiment of…
the  visual  images…in  the  random  access  memory  (RAM)  of  a  DVD  player  or 
personal computer…does not constitute the act of making a copy’.168 Then in Stevens 
the Court held that RAM storage of the computer program ‘did not entail reproduction 
of it in a material form’.169 There has been a pragmatic attempt to limit the scope of 
copies where the RAM module is concerned. Otherwise it would mean that every time 
a user listens to a music track on their computer there is a ‘copy’ played through the 
RAM module. Under what circumstances would this copy be an ‘infringing copy’? In 
the US, however, RAM copies are classed as reproductions, but have been subject to 
fair use.170
This example highlights that the specific space-shifting and time-shifting exceptions 
suggested by recent reform commissions171 would fast become redundant in a digital 
world  where  there  is  no  specific  space  or  time-based  origin  of  a  work.  Even 
Screenrights Australia has argued that these exceptions (and specifically the potential 
breadth of s 110AA) undermine the business models that are driving the uptake of 
digital  technology.172 It  also  offers  a  modern  version  of  the  problem  in  RIAA  v 
Diamond Multimedia173 where the Courts in the United States were asked whether 
transferring of a music file onto a RIO portable music player constituted fair use – 
which they ultimately held it did.174 Had they held otherwise then the iPod and all 
other  digital  music  technologies  would  have  been  extremely  limited.  The  ‘space 
shifting’ exception to copyright (which has not been confirmed by the Parliament or 
166 Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd (2005) 65 IPR 289 at 290.
167 See Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10 for the definition of ‘infringing copy’.
168 Australian Video Retailers Assoc’n v Warner Home Video Pty Ltd (2001) 114 FCR 324 at 341.
169 Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment (2005) 221 ALR 448 at 471.
170 BD Johnston, ‘Rethinking copyrights treatment of new technology: strategic obsolescence as a 
catalyst for interest group compromise’. (2009) 64 NYU Ann Surv Am Law 165, 190.
171 See the recent Issues Paper: Copying Photographs and Films in a different format for Private Use  
– a review of sections 47J and 110AA of the Copyright Act 1968 (January 2008), 11.
172 S Lake, ‘Submission: review of sections 47J and 110A of the Copyright Act 1968’, Screenrights  
Australia (29 February 2008).
173 Recording Industry Association of America v Diamond Multimedia Systems Inc. (1999) 180 F 3d 
1072 (9th Cir.).
174 Ibid.
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judiciary  per  se)  offers  a  safe  harbour  for  development  of  all  of  these  types  of 
technology.
The medium-requisite in the definition of terms has thus far led to inconsistent results 
and makes it difficult to consider how the Courts would classify streaming services. 
On the one hand, Lindgren and Finkelstein JJ argued in Stevens that the ambiguity in 
the Act ‘sustained the broader approach urged by [Sony Corp of America]’175 – in 
which case the Court would look to the content and the purpose of the Act rather than 
the technicalities of s 110 (the cinematograph film provision). The logical conclusion 
would be protection of the video game stored on the server subject to the fair use of 
the end-user. However, both the High Court in  Stevens176 and the Federal Court of 
Appeal in IceTV177 urged that there is only limited breadth in the Act to read content 
beyond the technical limitations of the relevant provisions. In this instance the Act is 
unable  to  deal  with  the  absence  of  a  ‘medium’  for  the  embodiment  of  a  work. 
Copyright protection is thus medium dependent and there is the potential for the abuse 
of the front-end if the back-end is not read broadly.
New Means of Exploitation
If there appears to be a gap between where the legislation currently is and where it 
should be in order to accommodate new subject matter and new media of fixation, 
then it pales in comparison to the gulf that exists when trying to accommodate new 
means of exploitation. In the past new means of exploitation included library access to 
books178 and rentals of films.179 In the digital age we have been confronted by new 
web-based exploitation models for existing content. This has been most profound in 
blurring the line between commercial and academic uses of student papers where anti-
plagiarism databases are concerned. The tentpole focus is Turntin.com.
The  turnitin.com service is  a web-based plagiarism detection service that  seeks to 
'stop the spread of internet plagiarism’.180 A university student may be required to 
upload their paper to the service in order to have the paper checked for plagiarism 
against a database of millions of student and academic writings. Once uploaded the 
student paper often becomes part of the archive. In June of 2007 four American high 
school  students  brought  an  action  for  infringement  of  copyright  of  their  research 
papers against the plagiarism prevention database turnitin.com (AV v iParadigms). 181 
It was alleged that if an academic paper was uploaded to the database by the school 
and the paper was subsequently archived to be used to assess future submissions, then 
175 Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment v Stevens [2003] FCAFC 157 at 183 (Lindgren J 
Finkelstein J concurred on this point).
176 Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment (2005) 221 ALR 448 at 450.
177 Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd v IceTV Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1172 at 1173.
178 M Wyburn, ‘Higher education and fair use: A wider copyright defence in the face of the Australia-
United States Free Trade Agreement changes’. (2006) 17 AIPJ 181 at 185.
179 Australian Video Retailers Assoc’n v Warner Home Video Pty Ltd (2001) 114 FCR 324.
180 iParadigms LLC’s Turnitin. About Us. http://www.turnitin.com/static/company.html
181 AV v iParadigms LLC (2008) USDC (EDV) 07-0293.
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it was not a fair use with respect to the Copyright Act 1976 (US).182 At first instance183 
and on appeal184 it was held that archive of the papers in this way constituted 'fair use', 
notwithstanding  that  turnitin.com was  'selling  its  services  without  giving  …any 
compensation'.185
However, if a case were to be brought by university students in Australia then the 
result could differ significantly.  The principle problem for the American Courts was 
whether  archiving  of  the  material  constituted  fair  use.186 §  107  of  the  American 
legislation  classes  ‘study’,  ‘scholarly  use’,  ‘research’,  ‘criticism’,  and ‘review’  all 
under one general fair use defence that is not limited to these terms. Critically, the 
Australian provision that contains the criteria (section 40) is limited to the dictionary 
definitions of 'research'187 and 'study' only.188 It is not a general fair use provision as it 
is in the United States.
Arguably, the conduct involved in the storage of documents to assess plagiarism is 
merely the 'gathering of information' and as such is not for the purpose of study or 
research (as was held in Re Attorney-General of British Columbia and Messier).189 It 
would seem that  in  light  of  the Federal  Court  finding in  Haines190 s  40 does  not 
include  teaching  purposes  (which  is  the  purpose  with  which  the  universities  and 
turnitin.com are engaged). The social benefit exception (s 200AB) fails to offer a safe 
harbour for turnitin.com because the service gains a commercial benefit.191
How could a service, which purports to offer a strong social benefit (anti-plagiarism), 
fail  to be within the ambit  of Australian copyright  legislation?  Despite the Court 
generally preferring ‘to take a broad approach to the Act’192 there is a failure of the 
fair dealing provisions to properly balance the media neutral  rights offered by the 
front-end  of  the  Act.  Further,  is  the  university  involved  potentially  liable  for 
‘authorising’ the infringement? Given the broad definition outlined by the Court in 
Cooper v Universal193 there appears to be potential  for university students to take 
action against the university as well.
182 17 USC § 107 .
183 Above n 181.
184 AV v iParadigms LLC (2009) USCA (4th Cir) 08-1424.
185 R Staino, ‘Courts: Turnitin doesn’t violate students’ copyright’. School Library Journal (30 April 
2009).
186 The closest Australian equivalent to the fair use exceptions are outlined in the Copyright Act 1968 
(Cth) ss 40-42.
187 Re Hoyts Multiplex Cinemas Pty Ltd and City of Gosnells [1997] WAICmr 1 at 26 (Cmr Keighly-
Gerardy quoting Beaumont J in De Garis).
188 De Garis v Neville Jeffress Pidler Pty Ltd (1990) 95 ALR 625 at 630 (Beaumont J).
189 (1984) 8 DLR (4th Circuit) 306.
190 Haines v CAL (1982) 42 ALR 549.
191 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 200AB.
192 Roadshow Films v iiNet (2010) 263 ALR 215.
193 Cooper v Universal Music Australia (2006) 237 ALR 714 at 123 (Kenny J) held that ‘the law in 
Australia attributed a wide meaning to the word “authorise” in this context.
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In the above examples we can see how obsolete specific media are becoming and with 
media specific exceptions the legislature will need to constantly update the legislation 
to reflect changes in technology, and piracy may forever manage to keep a step ahead 
of the law.
Problems with New Technologies
Through these burgeoning technologies we can see a particularly wide gap between 
what we currently have and what we need to deal with them. Is our Act capable of 
adopting these technologies? It appears so.
But if the Court  is willing to broaden the scope of these rights-giving provisions to 
encompass  these  new  technologies,  do  we  have  the  sufficient  back-end  (rights-
limiting) provisions in order to allow various types of uses of UGC and be able to use 
consolidated news sites and to allow use of commercial databases for academic uses? 
At the moment, we have a narrow back-end, and it prima facie appears that we may 
not be able to properly protect ‘fair uses’ of these technologies. The nature of new 
technologies questions whether copyright has a place in the digital environment in 
only a limited way or whether it need exist at all.
Conclusion
In one sense, and because copyright underpins most of the existing content creation 
and distribution models, the question is not so much whether copyright should exist at 
all, but how we should adapt our current copyright infrastructure to better provide for 
stakeholder balance in the face of emerging technologies.
With  an  over-specific,  complicated  and  increasingly  cumbersome  copyright  law 
colliding  with  the  reality  of  digital  technology,  the  need  for  simplification  and  a 
rational rethinking of how best to maintain the delicate balance is abundantly clear. 
There is a ‘serious question whether the set of constructs that make-up the Copyright  
Act…is sufficient to deal with the peculiar stresses produced by the application of…
anticipated  digital  technology’.194 Further,  with  the  development  of  user-centric 
technologies, it seems clear that the ideological and economic parochialism that has 
dominated legislative reform must give way to a balanced media neutral approach, 
mindful of streamlining the copyright legislation.
As it is, the Courts have had difficulty broadening the scope of the Copyright Act to 
cover new technologies – the inconsistent results being the quintessential example of 
the  confusion  the  Courts  have  found when  confronted  by the  imbalance  between 
broad,  media  neutral  front-end  provisions  and  narrow  media-specific  back-end 
provisions.  Even  where  the  Courts  have  recognised  copyright  law  as  coming  to 
illogical  and inconsistent  conclusions,  they have held that  policy-centric  decisions 
‘must be left to others in the executive government and the Parliament itself’.195 The 
Parliament  is  reluctant  to  engage  in  policy-making  vis-à-vis  copyright  itself, 
194 Halpern, n 1, 310.
195 Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment (2005) 221 ALR 448 at 492 (Kirby J).
Public Space: The Journal of Law and Social Justice (2010) Vol 5, Art 6, pp 1-24. 23
preferring to leave it to the judiciary to interpret the imbalanced legislation.196 This 
appears to be a never-ending spiral of lawmakers off-loading responsibility.
Although copyright is itself a product of technology, that should not take away from 
the  fact  that  it  operates  as  the  platform to  facilitate  balanced  exploitation  of  the 
creative  possibilities  of  new technologies.  Copyright  law has  forever  required  the 
existence of fixed mediums and technologies in which to empower rights –  it has 
needed technology – but if the law fails to adapt to the changing digital climate and 
alleviate the stakeholder imbalance between front and back-end rights, it may just find 
that technology doesn’t need it anymore. 
196 Ibid at 484 (Kirby J)
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